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Abstract: Engineering systems such as energy production facilities, aviation systems, maritime
vessels, etc. continue to grow in size and complexity. This growth has made the identification,
quantification and mitigation of risks associated with the failure of such systems so complicated.
To solve this problem, several advanced techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Reliability-Block Diagram (RBD), Reliability-Centered Maintenance
(RCM), Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS), Markov Analysis (MA) and Bayesian Networks (BN) have
been developed in the literature. In order to improve the strengths and eliminate the drawbacks of
classical techniques, some hybrid models have been recently developed. In this paper, an integrated
FTA and FMEA model is proposed for risk analysis of safety-critical systems. Minimal cut sets
derived from the fault trees are weighted based on Birnbaum’s measure of importance and then the
weights are used to revise Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) obtained from the use of traditional FMEA
techniques. The proposed model is applied to a Blowout Preventer (BOP) system operating under
erratic and extreme conditions in a subsea oil and gas field. Though those failures caused by kill
valves and hydraulic lines remain among the top risks in the BOP system, significant differences
are revealed in risk rankings when the results from the hybrid approach are compared with those
obtained from the classical risk analysis methods.
Keywords: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); blowout preventer
(BOP); risk analysis; minimal cut set; Birnbaum’s measure
1. Introduction
A system is considered complex if it comprises of several interacting components whose
series/parallel breakdown is impossible and the overall task cannot be obtained by the summation of
individual components’ activities [1]. Regardless of the degree of intricacy of the complex system under
study, some components are deemed critical, relative to others, regarding the safety and functionality
of the entire system. Due to the increasing complexity of engineering systems, the identification and
evaluation of risks associated with the failure of individual components is usually the starting point
for efficient reliability and safety analysis. For this purpose, several advanced techniques such as Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD),
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS), Markov Analysis (MA) and
Bayesian Networks (BN) have been developed in the literature [2–4].
FTA is a ‘top down’ Boolean logic tool commonly used to identify possible causes for potential
operating hazards or an undesired event. FMEA is another risk analysis technique that is extensively
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used across different industries, such as aerospace, automotive, energy, transport, etc. for determining
failure modes and corresponding effects on system performance. The successful application of both the
FTA and FMEA techniques has increased their adoption in several reliability and safety engineering
analyses studies. However, due to inherent limitations of each technique, coupled with the growing
complexity of engineering systems, the use of hybrid models has become very popular in recent years.
Integrated FTA and FMEA has been employed coherently and concurrently to enhance and
complement each other in several reliability applications. Forward integration (i.e., FMEA to FTA) and
backward integration (i.e., FTA to FMEA) have been proposed, with divers’ advantages associated with
each integration direction [5,6]. Lutz & Woodhouse [7] also propounded a bi-directional intertwine of
both techniques and used it to certify safety-critical software, paving the way for numerous studies on
integrating the software domains of both tools. The combination has successfully been applied in civil
aerospace and automotive domains. To effectively achieve a set reliability goal, ensure thoroughness
and completeness of analysis, and improve quality of analysis without compromise on overall safety,
it is necessary to redefine the underlying criteria governing techniques in a combinatorial framework.
In Xiao et al. [8], only the occurrence (O) of a failure is taken into consideration because the complex
system under consideration was non-repairable. Equal importance was given to all minimal cut sets in
terms of their effect on system performance, which caused the severity (S) of failure for all the system
components to be same.
By using the minimal cut sets theory and Birnbaum’s measure of importance, this paper aims to
develop a modified FMEA approach in the backward integration with FTA tool for the identification,
evaluation and prioritization of failure risks in safety-critical systems. In order to appropriately
identify and rank components according to their criticality, a weight will be assigned to the Risk
Priority Number (RPN) associated with each component’s failure mode. This weight represents the
importance of the component in overall system functionality. A case study of a subsea Blowout
Preventer (BOP) is presented to illustrate the applicability of the proposed model.
The rest of the paper continues with a background review of risk analysis techniques in Section 2,
followed by a full presentation of our proposed FTA-FMEA methodology in Section 3. Section 4
presents the case study and Section 5 concludes our paper.
2. Research Background
2.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
FTA is a deductive technique for identifying, evaluating, and modeling the interrelationship
between events leading to a failure or an undesired state [9]. It is a scientifically sound and
proven technique that models complex system interactions in an easy-to-read visual model.
Containing qualitative (cut sets) and quantitative (probabilities) sides, the structured, repetitive and
methodical construction process results in layers, levels and branches. Once a logical and systematic
picture of all immediate and basic causes leading to top event are identified, undesired events are
clearly depicted. Though FTA employs Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events
causing an undesired state of a system, the technique is static and incapable of examining multiple
failures [10]. It also is unintuitive and lacks the ability to properly account for dynamic interactions
between components. These and many other drawbacks make FTA limited in modeling dynamic
complex systems.
2.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a highly structured approach through which all potential failure modes of a system and
their effects can be identified, evaluated, and prioritized. The technique can result in cost/time-savings
when employed during early design stages by exposing probable operational challenges and
eliminating cascading failures. In this technique, the risk score for each failure mode is obtained by
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multiplying the individual scores for three risk factors of severity (S), occurrence (O), and detectability
(D). This composite risk is called “Risk Priority Number (RPN)” and is calculated by:
RPN = S × O × D (1)
where the risk factors S, O and D are rated on a scale 1–10 for each failure mode using the guidelines
presented in reference [11]. Therefore, the RPN values for different failure modes will range between
1 and 1000. Engineers should assign a threshold RPN value to classify failure modes. For instance,
in the current FMEA technique, precautions are taken for all failure modes whose RPN values exceed
100. Thus, a failure mode with RPN = 100 is considered as ‘corrective action required’, whereas another
failure mode with RPN = 98 is classed as ‘consider corrective action’.
The general principle governing the multiplication of risk factors to obtain RPNs and prioritization
of failure modes has been largely criticized [12]. For example, the three risk factors S, O and D are
assumed to have the same importance; or various combinations of S, O and D may produce an
identical RPN value, whereas the risk implication may be totally different and may result in high-risk
events going unnoticed; etc. Extensive work has been done in the recent years to improve the FMEA
process (see, e.g., references [13–15]). According to a detailed literature review performed by [16],
Artificial Intelligence (AI), fuzzy rule-based systems, Grey theory, and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
(MCDA) models such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Analytic Network Process (ANP) are
the most prominent methods used for overcoming the FMEA limitations. Furthermore, the cost-based
FMEA models pioneered by Gilchrist [17] have also gained popularity.
2.3. FTA and FMEA
Recently, applying both the FTA and FMEA techniques either simultaneously or in succession
has been proven to be complementary, effective and increasingly popular. Employed systematically,
an integrated FTA-FMEA technique can provide a thorough evaluation of system safety concerns [18].
FTA yields a comprehensive breakdown of faults leading to the undesired top event, whilst FMEA
furnishes the exact fashion in which these faults exists and their direct effects on the top event,
making the combination appropriate for safety and reliability analyses.
The backward integration of both tools seemingly provides stronger advantages, though many
researchers argue advantages depend on the specific application [9]. Khaiyum and Kumaraswamy [19]
carried out FTA in parallel and FMEA sequentially, to analyze and diagnose the different causes of
failures in a gas leak detection system. Limitations of the individual techniques were however not
explored. Bluvband et al. [20] in a unified bouncing approach considered multiple point failures
through interaction matrices, a major enhancement to the traditional FMEA. The interaction between
the techniques grows in complexity, requiring in-depth knowledge of the tools and particularly of the
system under study.
Employing the combination of FTA and FEMA for identifying critical components and reliability
analysis of highly complex systems has received little attention. Zhai et al. [21] combined three methods
of critical component identification, namely reliability prediction, FMEA and FTA in a reliability
tolerance design program for light-emitting diode (LED). Liu et al. [5] used the combination of FTA
and FMEA techniques to identify critical components in the manufacturing processes of a photovoltaic
power station in the bi-directional fashion, revising minimal cut sets and continually refining them.
Though software usage is incorporated, the process remains long and complex. As clearly seen,
these methodologies are not without limitations. Therefore, there still exists a crucial need to manage
different criteria of risk analysis techniques in a combinatorial framework to efficiently furnish and
complement each other, and be pertinent to specific safety and reliability requirements. In order to
tap maximum benefits of an FTA-FMEA integration, minimal cut set theory will be used in this study.
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Weights (w) are assigned to RPN values in the FMEA technique to incorporate the importance of each
component in the system. Therefore, the weighted RNP value is calculated by Equation (2), that is,
WRPN = w × S × O × D (2)
where as shown, w is factored into traditional RPN values to prioritize failure modes and thereafter
critical components. These weights are vital as they are representative of the importance of minimal
cut sets and hence all components are represented by the latter. The FTA methodology is selected
for this purpose, as it readily provides and ranks minimal cut sets in terms of importance to system
performance. Subsequent breakdown of minimal cut sets allows all components to be analyzed in
FMEA worksheets. Simplicity and ease of use are introduced through underlying theory that links
both techniques and the complex system under consideration, and is streamlined to component
level. The criticality of components is then calculated, not based on RPN but on the weighted RPN.
The details of the methodology are presented in the next Section.
3. Proposed Methodology
To integrate both the FTA and FMEA techniques for the purposes of identifying, evaluating
and prioritizing failure modes, a methodology is proposed based on the minimal cut sets theory and
Birnbaum’s measure of importance. In the backward integration framework, as shown in Figure 1,
components of the complex system under consideration are de-coupled by means of the FTA technique.
The undesired top event is identified based on the reliability requirements of the complex system
and initial itemization of components emanates from the fault trees. Results provide information to
subsequently adjust the FMEA criteria. With root nodes in the fault tree forming the base for system
function in the failure mode table, probability, severity and detectability measures are modified based
on the set reliability goal. The steps of the proposed methodology are explained below:
Ȃȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ
Figure 1. FTA-FMEA integration framework.
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3.1. Reliability Goal and System Boundary Definition
As a preliminary step in reliability assessment, particularly for complex systems, establishing
generic reliability requirements of the system under consideration acts as a reference for further
verification and validation. More so, the scope and element boundaries of the system require
elucidation as complexity by definition may depict considerably large systems, interacting with
several other elements.
3.2. System Breakdown
As stated by Kolowrocki [1], it is nearly impossible to model a complex system using the
traditional reliability analysis methods. The logical approach for this purpose is to subdivide
the system into smaller units and employ probabilistic techniques to calculate overall reliability,
based on reliability of the subsystems. Once the scope and boundaries are defined, clarity on further
categorization of the system under consideration is facilitated, particularly for any expert or analyst
with considerable knowledge.
3.3. FTA Steps
This phase includes slight modifications to the traditional FTA steps. The top event is defined
and all immediate causes are identified. Again, secondary level events are specified and all root causes
down to basic level are identified. The fault tree diagram is built and different fault combinations
leading to top event are presented. At this stage, several fault trees may become necessary, dependent
on the complexity of the system under consideration. For this reason, utilization of software
applications for building and analyzing fault trees can facilitate the process. Finally, minimal cut sets
are obtained and their importance weights are evaluated. Assuming w is an independent function
variable representing the importance of ith minimal cut set in the fault tree structure, we have:
wi = F(Xi), i = 1, 2 (3)
where Xi represents the importance of the ith minimal cut set and F(Xi) is a function with independent
variable Xi. By substituting Equation (3) in Equation (2), we have:
WRPNi = F(Xi) × Si × Oi × Di, · · · i = 1, 2 (4)
Quantitative perspectives on dominant contributors to the top event can be provided by
calculating the importance measure of the components in the system. Several methods such
as Fussell-Vesely, Birnbaum, etc. have been developed in the literature for this purpose [22].
Though Fussell-Vesely is the most commonly used approach, it does not necessarily identify all
minimal cut sets in a complex system. Birnbaum’s measure is hence selected and used in this study as
modification and versatility based on system application is possible. Hence, the importance of the ith
minimal cut set is given by:
Xi = δhp/δpi = h(1i, p
(i)) - h(0i, p
(i)) (5)
where h(1i, p
(i)) presents the probability that the system fails when component i fails and h(0i, p
(i)) presents
the probability that the system fails when component i is working. wi is a value between zero and one,
i.e., wi ∈ [0,1], and thus it will have little impact on RPN values which are integer numbers between 1 and
1000. Based on the assessment catalogue proposed by Pickard et al. [23], Table 1 is created to magnify
individual importance indices and map them to corresponding domain functions F(Xi).
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Table 1. Ranking criteria for the weights.
Xi (wi) F (Xi)
1 (0.000001) 1
10 (0.00001) 2
100 (0.0001) 3
1000 (0.001) 4
5000 (0.005) 5
10000 (0.01) 6
50000 (0.05) 7
100000 (0.1) 8
500000 (0.1) 9
1000000 (1) 10
3.4. FMEA Steps
Aside from typical FMEA steps that are detailed and explained in reference [11], the additional
tasks that should be implemented at this stage include revising traditional RPN values and ranking
components based on theweighted RPNs. Experts brainstorm and report the results as in the traditional
FMEA process. In this case, the minimal cut sets that were obtained from the fault trees aid the failure
mode identification process. The weights are multiplied with RPNs obtained from the traditional
FMEA procedure. It must be noted that minimal cut sets may include one or more components which
should be assigned relative importance, as multiple failures are not considered. Components with
highest RPNs may not necessarily possess highest WRPNs in this methodology, hence added criteria
for ranking. An integrated FTA-FMEA worksheet carrying all necessary data from the traditional FTA
and FMEA approaches is shown in Table 2, ending with suggested preventive actions.
Table 2. An integrated FTA-FMEA worksheet.
System: Report No.
Component: Prepared by:
Team: Date:
FTA FMEA
MCS
Component/
subsystem
Xi F(Xi)
Fail.
mode
Fail.
cause
Fail.
effect
Ctrl.
Mech.
S O D RPN Priority WRPN
New
priority
Action
required
The traditional approaches of both FTA and FMEA techniques are revisited though all
relevant software advances. This is to provide the basis for criteria amelioration at every stage.
Certain assumptions are considered with this methodology:
- Failure modes in FMEA are a direct result of the faults identified in the FTA process and the
failure causes are assumed to be mutually independent.
- In the FMEA method, only the most critical failure modes are considered. Double or multiple
failuremodes inclusion, though representing amajor improvement to traditional FMEA, would be
important only when the assessment’s aim is beyond the scope of this work such as risk
identification and further quantitative analysis.
- The complex system under consideration should be coherent and modular with each module
relevant to system functioning, with the FTA possessing only AND and OR gates.
In the next section, a case study is presented to illustrate the application of the proposed model in
an industrial context.
4. Case Study
Blowout Preventers (BOPs) are considered the last line of defense in any drilling or workover
oil and gas operations. In an array of stacked valves (see Figure 2), where one or more lower level
non-critical components can result in a common undesired event, FTA is a suitable tool as it identifies
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minimal cut sets and minimal path sets of common-cause failure (CCF). This is particularly important
for BOP systems, as in an assembly with parallel connections, wherein CCF is a major characteristic [24].
FTA has been so far employed in several BOP reliability analyses (see, e.g., references [25–28]),
proving to be convenient for identifying failure modes within the BOP stack. Fowler and Roche [29]
used both FTA and FMEA for reliability analysis of the device and its hydraulic control system.
They employed the inductive bottom-up approach to determine consequences of part malfunction
and to link undesired events to their causes, the deductive supplement. FMEA was again extended
to include criticality and applied to the entire system in a study conducted by American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) and ABSG Consulting Inc. for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE) [30]. A BOP reliability analysis model was recently developed by employing the software
package Norsys Netica (https://www.norsys.com/netica.html) to aid in identification, evaluation,
and prioritization of failure risks [31].
Figure 2. Typical BOP stack and components.
For complex systems such as BOP in which interdependencies between sub-components are
complicated, combined (hybrid) techniques are worthwhile. Identifying critical components in a
system with over seven (7) main subsystems, housing about 600 individual components may be
the starting point for more detailed qualitative and quantitative analyses. The proposed integration
methodology is explained step by step as follows:
1. Reliability goal and system boundary definition
- Identification of critical components within the system: As a large specialized and
mechanical valve assembly that is used to seal wells against kicks or blowouts during
drilling or work-over operations, a critical component will be the one whose failure will
lead to the failure of the entire system or a major part of it.
- Setting overall reliability requirements for the system: Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
requirements are widely accepted for the basis of operation and design of Safety
Instrumented Systems. For BOP systems, the IEC 61508 requirements for the safety
integrated functions are applied [32].
- Defining system specifications: The BOP system considered in this study is a type of class
VI configuration with 4 rams and dual annular. Main subsystems (from the upper annular
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preventer to the wellhead connector) make up components under investigation, ignoring
surface controls, panels and accumulators as shown in Figure 2.
2. System Breakdown Physical and functional categorization of components is achieved as part of
the requirements for FTA and FMEA. Major components of the BOP as identified in the literature
include: control system (pods, accumulators, auto-shear system), ram preventers (pipe, blind-shear
and/or casing-shear preventers), annular preventers (lower and upper), connectors (wellhead and
Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP)) and kill/choke system (valves and lines).
3. FTA Steps The undesired top event for a BOP is a blowout once a kick cannot be killed.
This forms the apex, upon which the fault tree is built and shown in Figure 3, alongside
the immediate top-level basic events. Analyses at this stage were aided by a professional
software called FaultTree+TM [33], requiring overall structural and functional knowledge about
the system. All cut sets were determined and the weights were calculated by Equations (4) and (5).
The minimal cut sets and gate summary of the BOP’s fault tree are extensive and not thoroughly
presented here. Table 3 gives the results obtained for some components and presents the cut sets
with associated rankings calculated from Table 1, to demonstrate applicability.
4. FMEA Steps An FMEA standard procedure is followed at this stage. In this case, however,
a detailed FMEA study is conducted on BOP system using the severity, occurrence and detectability
ratings reported in reference [34]. The methodology used ten-point scales for severity rating
(see Table 4), occurrence rating (see Table 5), and detectability rating (see Table 6) to represent the
risk priorities of the BOP failures.
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Figure 3. Top level of fault tree.
Table 3. Weights and rankings of some BOP components.
Minimal Cut Set Associated Component(s) Importance Weight Ranking
B0 Wellhead connector 1 10
D001; D002
Pod 1 (blue pod) 0.106 8
Pod 2 (yellow pod) 0.106 8
B00000; B0000; B00
Lower pipe ram 0.00001 2
Upper pipe ram 0.000053 2
Blinds shear ram 0.233 8
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Table 4. Severity ratings of a failure for BOP.
Severity Rating Significance Personnel Environment Downtime
1
Does not affect BOP
functionality; no impact on
safety and environment
No impact No impact
No downtime, repair can
be done while drilling
continues.
2
Does not affect BOP
functionality but needs to
be corrected; no impact on
safety and environment.
No impact No impact
No downtime, repair can
be done at next
opportunity, drilling
continues.
3
Partial loss of BOP
function; no loss of well
control
No impact No impact
Downtime of less than a
shift, stop drilling,
intervene and repair.
4
Partial loss of BOP
function; no loss of well
control.
No impact No impact
Downtime between a shift
and 24 h, stop drilling,
intervene and repair.
5
Partial loss of BOP
primary function if not
corrected immediately.
No impact No impact
Downtime between 1 and
7 days—stop drilling,
intervene and repair
(surface only).
6
Partial loss of BOP
primary function if not
corrected immediately.
Minor injury no
recordable lost
time
Minor external subsea leak
(e.g., choke & kill (C&K0
Connector leak)
Downtime between 8 and
21 days—stop drilling,
intervene and repair
(surface only).
7
Loss of BOP primary
function.
Minor Injury;
some lost time
Significant external subsea
leak (e.g., major connector
leak)
Pulling LMRP only
8
Loss of BOP primary
function.
Serious Injury;
significant lost
time.
<1000 barrels Pulling LMRP/BOP stack
9
Loss of BOP primary
function.
Single Fatality;
multiple
serious injuries
>1000 barrels
Shut down of operations;
drilling stopped and major
regulatory implications;
changes to drilling
schedule >3 months.
10
Loss of BOP primary
function.
Multiple
fatalities and
injuries
>10,000 barrels and severe
environmental damage
over a large area.
Shut down of operations;
drilling stopped and major
regulatory implications;
total loss of asset.
Table 5. Occurrence ratings of a failure for BOP.
Occurrence Rating Frequency/Rig Year Occurrence
1 <1 event every 100 rig years
Less than 1% chance every 10 years of
operation
2
<1 event every 10 rig years to 1 event
every 100 rig years
Less than once every 10 years to 10%
chance every 10 years of operation
3
<1 event every 5 rig years to 1 event
every 10 rig years
Less than once every 5 years to once
every 10 years
4
<1 event every 2 rig years to 1 event
every 5 rig years
Less than once every 2 years to once
every 5 years
5
<1 event/rig yr. to 1 event every 2 rig
years
Less than once a year to once every 2
years
6 <2 events/rig yr. to 1 event/yr. Less than twice a year to once a year
7 <4 events/rig yr. to 2 events /yr. Less than once a quarter to twice a year
8 <10 events/rig yr. to 4 events /rig yr.
Less than once a month to once a
quarter
9 <50 events/rig yr. to 10 events /rig yr. Less than once a week to once a month
10 >50+ events/rig yr. Once a week or more often
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Table 6. Detectability ratings of a failure for BOP.
Detection Rating Detection Likelihood of Detection
1 Almost certain
Very high probability of detection (>90% probability of
detection) by design controls (redundant or independent
self-diagnostic capability, independent alarms) will
certainly detect failures
2 Very high
High probability of detection (50 to 90% of detection) by
design controls (single device self-diagnostic capability,
single alarms, visual monitoring, leak monitoring, loss of
fluid etc.) will certainly detect failures
3 High
Probability of detection via weekly on-stream
tests/inspections will provide immediate detection of
the failure
4 Moderately high
Probability of detection via monthly on-stream
tests/inspections will provide immediate detection of
the failure
5 Moderate
Probability of detection via quarterly on-stream
tests/inspections will provide immediate detection of
the failure
6 Low
Can only be detected during routine inspections/tests
while the BOP is pulled from the well
7–8 Very low
Can only be detected during major PMs while the BOP is
pulled from the well
9 Remote
Can only be detected and/or corrected during major
overhaul or rebuilding-type activities
10 Absolute uncertainty
Currently no design controls or maintenance techniques
in place
Weighted RPNs are then calculated by multiplying the traditional RPN values with the weight
factor, resulting in weighted RPN values to become between 1 and 10,000. Comparatively, components
requiring greater corrective action and implicitly considered to be critical based on the traditional FMEA
approach differ from those obtained by the proposed FTA-FMEA technique. Table 7 demonstrates this
for a cross section of components and reveals that control pods may require more attention after blind
shear rams as opposed to pipe rams in the traditional FMEA ranking system.
Table 7. A comparison between the results obtained from the traditional FMEA technique with those
obtained by the proposed method.
Component RPN from Traditional FMEA Weighted RPN from FTA-FMEA Approach
Wellhead connector 40 400
Blue Pod 35 280
Yellow pod 35 280
Lower pipe ram 70 140
Upper pipe ram 76 152
Blind shear ram 80 640
Figure 4 provides a clear comparison between the traditional RPN values and the weighted
RPN values.
Though some components such as the kill valves still remain at top priority in RPN rankings
with the proposed technique, a clear disparity in rankings and hence in the criticality of components
is depicted in others such as the connectors (wellhead and LMRP). Choke valves are ranked at
the same level with casing shear rams and are higher than blind shear rams and accumulators.
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Comprehensive analyses of the system produce results that may significantly alter corrective measures
and criticality priorities for the BOP and any complex system in general. Whilst FMEA focuses
on causal effects, taking into consideration all possible failures but not necessarily component
interdependencies, FTA considers the latter but avoids minute components and their effects on overall
system failure. The integration of the techniques is proven to produce more robust prioritization of
system risks as greater failure severity may not necessarily mean greater criticality. This phenomenon
becomes explicit when weighted RPNs for BOP under two different operating conditions, namely
deep-water and shallow-water, are compared. Six experts are consulted to provide their opinion on the
severity, occurrence and detectability of various failure modes, and a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
(MCDA) method based on Weighted Sum Model (WSM) is used to aggregate the experts’ opinions
(see Tables 8–10). Though FMEA requires the experts to brainstorm on every aspect of FMEA process,
ambiguity is avoided by disseminating similar FMEA worksheets to experts, containing the specific
components/subsystems as previously established and their single associated undesired failure mode.
Judgement is elicited mainly on the severity, occurrence and detectability ratings of failure modes.
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Table 8. Weighting criteria for the group of experts.
Constitution Classification Score
Occupation
Field expert (Engineer) 4
Senior academia 3
Junior academia 2
Technician 1
Experience
Above 30 years 4
20–29 3
10–19 2
0–9 1
Education
PhD 4
MSc 3
BSc 2
HND 1
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Table 9. Expert weighting.
Expert Occupation Experience Education Weight Factor Weight Score
1 Engineer = 4 [0–9] = 1 PhD = 4 4 + 1 + 4 = 9 0.16
2 Engineer = 4 [10–19] = 2 PhD = 4 4 + 2 + 4 = 10 0.18
3 Engineer = 4 [10–19] = 2 PhD = 4 4 + 2 + 4 = 10 0.18
4 Junior academia = 2 [10–19] = 2 MSc = 3 2 + 2 + 3 = 7 0.13
5 Senior academia = 3 [20–29] = 3 PhD = 4 3 + 3 + 4 = 10 0.18
6 Senior academia = 3 [20–29] = 3 PhD = 4 3 + 3 + 4 = 10 0.18
Total = 56 Total = 1
Table 10. Final aggregation for RPNs (example of the blind shear ram component).
Expert RPN Weight Score Weighting
1 60 0.16 60 × 0.16 = 9.6
2 70 0.18 70 × 0.18 = 12.6
3 192 0.18 192 × 0.18 = 34.56
4 96 0.13 96 × 0.13 = 12.48
5 84 0.18 84 × 0.18 = 15.12
6 70 0.18 70 × 0.18 = 12.6
Total = 96.96≈ 97
As expected, RPN values for all BOP components in deep waters are larger than those in shallow
waters, however, significant differences exist between ranking priorities in deep and shallow waters,
as shown in Figure 5. The robustness of the technique is proven as components such as the wellhead
connector and casing shear ram gain significant priority leaps in deep water, in compliance with
research and regulatory standards.
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cases.
5. Conclusions
This paper presented an integrated methodology of fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA) in a manner that provides a modified, systematic and structured approach
for identifying, evaluating and prioritizing the risks associated with different components in a complex
system. The synergy of complementary techniques is harnessed by modifying criteria, hence increasing
efficiency in analysis. By using the proposed technique, it is possible to gain insights about any
complex system which otherwise might be overlooked. The basis for corrective action is improved in
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a computationally sound manner. The application of the proposed methodology was demonstrated
with a critical subsea oil and gas system known as Blowout Preventer (BOP).
The results of the study proved the benefits of the proposed FTA-FMEA methodology and
combinatorial risk analysis techniques in general. Components that may be overlooked based on the
traditional FMEA technique were brought to the limelight for consideration. More so, the priority
rankings were improved significantly. Minute changes in ranking order may have huge implications,
particularly for a safety-critical system such as BOP. Aside being essential for further quantitative
research, component priority can significantly alter maintenance and testing policies. As shown
in Table 7 and Figure 4, some components such as the kill valves remained at top priority in RPN
rankings with the proposed technique. However, a clear disparity in rankings was observed for some
components such as the connectors (wellhead and LMRP). Choke valves were ranked at the same level
with casing shear rams and were higher than blind shear rams and accumulators.
Future research can be directed towards the effects of double and multiple failures, the comparative
difference obtained when different importance measures are used, and linking the software interphases
of the proposed integration scheme. Also, the normed design of subsea accumulators for actuation and
control of BOPs may sometimes not be safe (see reference [35]). Thus, consideration of the actuation of the
BOP and its design in reliability analysis can be an interesting subject for research.
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Acronyms
D detectability of a failure
h(1i, p(i)) probability that the system fails when component i fails
h(0i, p(i)) probability that the system fails when component i is working
O occurrence of a failure
RPN risk-priority-number
S severity of a failure
wi importance of ith component in the system
WRPN weighted RPN
Xi importance of the ith minimal cut set in the fault tree structure
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